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OUT OF SIGHT, BUT NOT OUT OF MIND:
REEVALUATING THE ROLE OF FEDERALISM IN
ADEQUATELY REGULATING CONCENTRATED
ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS
MADHAVI KULKARNI*
INTRODUCTION
Every year, over nine billion land animals are killed in the United
States to produce meat, dairy, and other animal products for consumers.1
While tactful marketing and lobbying by large and powerful animal agri-
culture companies and trade associations continue to convince consumers
of the idyllic, often pristine origins of their food, the reality could not be
further from this facade.2 Today, an estimated 99 percent of farm ani-
mals destined for consumption are raised in large-scale industrial animal
agriculture operations, or factory farms.3 Concentrated animal feeding
operations (“CAFOs”) are large scale factory farms where more than 1,000
animal units are confined in a small area of land for at least forty-five
days.4 One animal unit is defined as 1,000 pounds of a live animal.5
Although CAFOs only account for about 5 percent of United States
animal agriculture operations by number, they produce more than 50 per-
cent of the animals that are slaughtered for food.6 CAFOs also produce
* JD Candidate, William & Mary Law School, 2020; Editor-in-Chief, William & Mary
Environmental Law and Policy Review, Volume 44; BA Economics, Rutgers University,
2017, summa cum laude. The author would like to thank the members of the ELPR Board
and staff for their diligent efforts on this Note and their continued dedication to Volume 44.
1 Factory Farms, WELL-FED WORLD, https://awfw.org/factory-farms/ [https://perma.cc
/9GD4-2GDW] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019).
2 See Inhumane Practices on Factory Farms, ANIMAL WELFARE INST., https://awionline
.org/content/inhumane-practices-factory-farms [https://perma.cc/XZ9Y-M2LP] (last visited
Nov. 12, 2019) (describing the inhumane methods of rearing farm animals on industrial
factory farms).
3 Factory farming: assessing investment risks, FARM ANIMAL INV. RISK & RETURN, https://
www.fairr.org/article/factory-farming-assessing-investment-risks/ [https://perma.cc/45YN
-ZNUB] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019).
4 Animal Feeding Operations, NAT’L RESOURCES CONSERVATION SERV., https://www.nrcs
.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/main/national/plantsanimals/livestock/afo/ [https://perma.cc
/LMU2-6M45] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019).
5 Id.
6 DOUG GURIAN-SHERMAN, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, CAFOS UNCOVERED: THE
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300 million tons of animal manure per year.7 This accounts for approxi-
mately 65 percent of the total manure produced by United States animal
agriculture and is more than double the amount generated by the human
population in the United States.8 Due to the sheer amount of manure pro-
duced on small areas of land, the runoff of CAFO waste into surface and
groundwater is common.9 Additionally, CAFOs emit pollutants such as
ammonia, hydrogen sulfide, particulate matter, volatile organic compounds
(“VOCs”), and nitrous oxide into the air.10 Therefore, animal agriculture
practices in the United States, and CAFOs specifically, implicate the ques-
tion of whether or not environmental laws are adequate in regulating the
activities of CAFOs.
This Note will argue that current state and federal laws are sorely
inadequate in regulating CAFOs and demonstrate that the government
entities charged with enforcing what few laws currently exist have had
little success in satisfactorily performing their roles.11 To protect the en-
vironment from the widespread and predictably devastating effects of
CAFOs on the land, water, and air resources of the United States, it is nec-
essary to rethink the role of federalism as it relates to environmental law.12
Given the dearth of environmental statutes and regulations governing the
operation of CAFOs and the strong lobbying powers that have led to the
externalization of costs,13 a reexamination of the relationship between the
federal government and the states, as well as the distribution of the power
to enact and enforce environmental regulations is necessary. As they
stand, many major federal environmental protection statutes, including
the Clean Water Act; the Clean Air Act; and the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act fail to adequately
regulate CAFOs, and sometimes even exclude CAFOs from regulation.14
Since agriculture is one of the biggest sources of water pollution
in the country,15 the practice of deregulating large agricultural farms such
UNTOLD COSTS OF CONFINED ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS 2 (2008), https://www.organic
consumers.org/sites/default/files/cafos_uncovered.pdf [https://perma.cc/6NGP-BYSW].
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 3.
10 CAFO regulations, WHAT WORKS FOR HEALTH—POLICIES & PROGRAMS TO IMPROVE
WISCONSIN’S HEALTH, http://whatworksforhealth.wisc.edu/program.php?t1=109&t2=7&t3
=129&id=650 [https://perma.cc/GR97-BUZE] (last updated Apr. 21, 2017).
11 See infra Part IV.
12 Id.
13 See infra Parts I & II.
14 See infra Section I.A.
15 The Main Causes of Water Pollution in the U.S., ARCADIA POWER BLOG, https://blog.ar
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as CAFOs poses pressing environmental threats. In the absence of federal
regulations, states have attempted to enact their own laws to regulate
CAFOs and mitigate their harmful effects.16 While these efforts are a step
in the right direction, more widespread adoption of state laws and more
consistent enforcement are necessary for these efforts to make a lasting
impact. This is especially true in the face of barriers such as negative mar-
ket externalities, often in the form of tax incentives for big agriculture.17
Both federal and state governments must begin to view CAFOs
as a serious environmental threat and take action. First, the federal gov-
ernment, acting through the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”),
should develop a system through which it regularly enforces existing en-
vironmental laws against CAFOs. To this end, this Note proposes a cross-
regional accountability system and requirements for communication
between the EPA and state agencies that regulate CAFOs. Turning to the
states, this Note proposes a two-pronged revitalization program. The first
prong is to work towards more consistent and targeted enforcement of
federal statutes and regulations, subject to a cross-agency accountability
system similar to the federal level. The second prong is the enactment of
more stringent, uniform state regulations of CAFOs drawing inspiration
from the states that have successfully enacted these types of regulations.
The communication requirements for the EPA should also apply to state
agencies. Bolstering the individual responsibilities of both the federal gov-
ernment and state governments, reanalyzing the relationship between
the two, and shifting certain responsibilities from one to the other are
necessary for the adequate regulation of CAFOs.
I. CURRENT LAWS GOVERNING CAFOS AND WHY CURRENT
LEGISLATION IS INADEQUATE
A. Federal Laws
1. The Clean Water Act
The Clean Water Act (“CWA”) established the “basic structure for
regulating discharges of pollutants into the waters of the United States and
regulating quality standards for surface waters.”18 The CWA established
cadiapower.com/main-causes-water-pollution-u-s/ [https://perma.cc/22KM-AHLU] (last
visited Nov. 12, 2019).
16 See infra Section I.B.
17 See infra Section II.C.
18 Summary of the Clean Water Act, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/summary
-clean-water-act [https://perma.cc/7RPY-6J9D] (last updated Mar. 29, 2018).
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the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”) permit-
ting program.19 This program requires the acquisition of permits before
dredged or fill material from point sources may be discharged into the
navigable waters of the United States.20 This permitting system is meant
to ensure compliance with, and aid in, the enforcement of the CWA.21 The
primary mechanism in the NPDES permit through which the EPA controls
discharges of pollutants is establishing effluent limitations.22 Effluent
limitations establish limits on the amount of hazardous pollutants that
can be discharged into the navigable waters of the United States.23 These
limits are based on: (1) the technology available to control the pollutants
and (2) the target water quality standards of a particular body of water.24
While not all animal feeding operations are considered point
sources for purposes of the CWA, point sources are specifically defined
to include CAFOs.25 Thus, any CAFO that discharges into a navigable
water of the United States, which is defined broadly as a “water of the
United States,”26 is subject to all the NPDES permitting requirements.
Permit applications for CAFOs require, among other things, information
about the “estimated amounts of manure, litter, and process wastewater
generated” and nutrient management plans (“NMP”).27 The NMP must
contain best management practices (“BMP”), which are “schedules of ac-
tivities, prohibitions of practices, maintenance procedures, and other
management practices [that] prevent or reduce the pollution of waters of
the United States.”28 Other requirements of the NMP include, but are not
limited to, adequate storage and testing of manure and proper manage-
ment of dead animals.29
Although the EPA is the chief regulator of the CWA, and therefore
of NPDES permits, the agency has authorized forty-six states to implement
19 NPDES Permit Basics, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/npdes/npdes-permit-basics [https://
perma.cc/H7SQ-6YNZ] (last updated July 25, 2018).
20 Clean Water Act (CWA) Compliance Monitoring, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/compli
ance/clean-water-act-cwa-compliance-monitoring [https://perma.cc/5QD9-6FRD] (last
updated Feb. 15, 2018).
21 Id.
22 NPDES Permit Limits, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/npdes/npdes-permit-limits [https://
perma.cc/V4HL-6VBH] (last updated Nov. 29, 2016).
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2008).
26 § 1362(7).
27 40 C.F.R. § 122.21 (2018).
28 § 122.2.
29 § 122.42(e)(1).
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their own NPDES permitting systems.30 States who wish to administer
their own NPDES permitting programs must submit several documents
to the EPA, including a Memorandum of Agreement (“MOA”), which de-
tails the proposed state permitting program.31 The EPA must approve of
the program before a state may administer NPDES permits.32
2. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act & the Emergency Planning and Community
Right-to-Know Act
Both the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) and the Emergency Planning and
Community Right-to-Know Act (“EPCRA”) require individuals and busi-
nesses to report any release of hazardous substances within twenty-four
hours of their release, if these substances meet or exceed reportable
quantities.33 This notification requirement is meant to alert federal, state,
and local authorities of the need for an emergency response to the release
of hazardous substances.34
Until early 2018, the reporting of hazardous air emissions from
animal waste that met or exceeded reportable quantities was required
under CERCLA.35 However, on March 23, 2018, the Fair Agricultural
Reporting Method Act (“FARM Act”) was passed, which amended CERCLA
provisions to exempt farms from reporting hazardous air emissions due
to animal waste that would otherwise have met the standards for report-
ing.36 Consequently, the EPA published a final rule on August 1, 2018,
which revised the CERCLA reporting regulations, incorporating the FARM
Act amendments.37 Additionally, in November 2018, the EPA proposed an
amendment to EPCRA to exempt farms from reporting any air emissions
30 About NPDES, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/npdes/about-npdes [https://perma.cc/JGM3
-7HPM] (last updated Nov. 29, 2016).
31 NPDES State Program Information, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/npdes/npdes-state-pro
gram-information [https://perma.cc/7ADN-3S6L] (last updated Dec. 11, 2018).
32 Id.
33 CERCLA and EPCRA Reporting Requirements for Air Releases of Hazardous Sub-
stances from Animal Waste at Farms, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/epcra/cercla-and-epcra
-reporting-requirements-air-releases-hazardous-substances-animal-waste-farms [https://
perma.cc/JGB2-HRFM] (last updated Nov. 21, 2018).
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
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from animal waste.38 The proposed rule sought to define the terms “animal
waste” and “farm” in EPCRA regulations in the same way they are defined
under CERCLA in order to homogenize which farms CERCLA and EPCRA
exemptions would apply to.39 This rule was finalized in June 2019.40
3. The Clean Air Act
The Clean Air Act (“CAA”) regulates air emissions from stationary
and mobile sources by setting National Ambient Air Quality Standards
(“NAAQS”) for six principal pollutants, known as criteria pollutants.41
These pollutants are carbon monoxide (CO), lead (Pb), nitrogen dioxide
(NO2), ozone (O3), particulate matter (PM), and sulfur dioxide (SO2).42 The
CAA identifies two different air quality standards: a primary standard,
for the protection of human health, and a secondary standard, for the pro-
tection of public welfare.43 In order for a pollutant to be deemed a criteria
pollutant, its emission must “cause or contribute to air pollution which
may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”44
The EPA has not made a finding that CAFO emissions can “rea-
sonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”45 Thus, the
agency has not established NAAQS for air emissions from CAFOs.46
Further, the EPA has refused to grant a 2009 petition, filed by The Hu-
mane Society of the United States and other environmental groups, to
list CAFOs under section 111 of the CAA, which sets emission standards
for stationary sources that significantly “endanger public health or wel-
fare.”47 The EPA acknowledged that livestock are potential sources of air
38 Id.
39 Emergency Release Notification Regulations on Reporting Exemption for Air Emissions
From Animal Waste at Farms; Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act,
83 Fed. Reg. 220 (proposed Nov. 14, 2018) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 355).
40 EPA, supra note 33.
41 EPA, supra note 18.
42 NAAQS Table, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/criteria-air-pollutants/naaqs-table [https://
perma.cc/G7TH-PKDT] (last updated Dec. 20, 2016).
43 Id.
44 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1) (2012).
45 Clean Air Act Does Not Require EPA to Regulate Emissions From Animal Feeding Opera-
tions, TAFT L. (July 17, 2014), https://www.taftlaw.com/news-events/law-bulletins/clean
-air-act-does-not-require-epa-to-regulate-emissions-from-animal-feeding-operations
[https://perma.cc/B474-G9K6].
46 Id.
47 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1) (2012); EPA puts CAFO emission measurement reg on hold,
CAPITAL PRESS (Jan. 4, 2018), http://www.capitalpress.com/20180104/epa-puts-cafo-emis
sion-measurement-reg-on-hold [https://perma.cc/R8KJ-YQLZ].
2019] OUT OF SIGHT, BUT NOT OUT OF MIND 291
pollutants, but claimed that regulating emissions of these pollutants under
the CAA is not justified because there is no reliable method to measure
these emissions.48 A citizen suit brought by residents of Winneshiek
County, Iowa, in which they argued that the EPA has a “nondiscretion-
ary duty” under the CAA to regulate CAFO emissions, has also been un-
successful.49 Thus, there is no targeted regulation of CAFO emissions under
the CAA.50
B. State Laws
Certain states have enacted additional regulations that go beyond
the few federal requirements placed on the operation of CAFOs.51 Several
states regulate CAFO-related odors, which are not expressly regulated
by federal law.52 Seven states (Alabama, Missouri, Nebraska, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Texas) require CAFO operators to identify
sources of odors and submit an odor management or control plan.53 Some
of these states also require the implementation of BMPs to minimize or
eliminate these odors.54
While all NPDES permits must include an NMP,55 federal NMPs
are not required to address issues unique to CAFOs, such as odor.56
However, Idaho and North Dakota require CAFOs to consider the effects
of their operations on odor when drafting their NMPs for their NPDES
permit applications.57 Additionally, several states impose requirements
on CAFO operators to develop waste management plans (“WMPs”), pollu-
tion prevention plans (“PPPs”), or obtain air quality permits (“AQPs”) to
expressly address odor minimization.58
48 CAPITAL PRESS, supra note 47.
49 Zook v. McCarthy, 52 F. Supp. 3d 69, 71 (D.D.C. 2014) (ruling that the EPA only has a
discretionary duty under the CAA to regulate CAFO emissions).
50 See CAPITAL PRESS, supra note 47.
51 See generally OFF. FOR STATE, TRIBAL, LOCAL & TERRITORIAL SUPPORT, CDC, MENU OF
STATE LAWS REGARDING ODORS PRODUCED BY CONCENTRATED ANIMAL FEEDING OPERA-
TIONS (Jan. 21, 2016), https://www.cdc.gov/phlp/docs/menu-environmentalodors.pdf [https://
perma.cc/DMU6-YCX9] (detailing several state laws for the regulation of CAFOs).
52 See id.
53 Id. at 2, 5.
54 Id. at 2.
55 40 C.F.R. § 122.42(e)(1) (2012).
56 See § 122.23(h).
57 OFF. FOR STATE, TRIBAL, LOCAL & TERRITORIAL SUPPORT, CDC, supra note 51, at 2–3.
58 For example, Oklahoma and Alabama require CAFOs to consider odor prevention in
WMPs, Texas requires CAFOs to obtain AQPs, and Oklahoma and Texas require CAFOs
to address odor in PPPs. Id. at 3.
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Several states have also placed more stringent effluent limits on
CAFOs than required by federal regulations.59 Many states also impose
limitations on the land application of waste, which is the primary mecha-
nism of waste disposal for CAFOs.60 Under an NPDES permit, the rate of
land application of solid animal waste—known as the agronomic rate—is
typically determined based on the nitrogen needs of crops.61 Forty states
require that solid waste from CAFOs be applied at this agronomic rate.62
Thirty-eight states require the development and use of WMPs,63 though
not all require consideration of odor while developing these plans.64 One
state, Georgia, requires a land application system (“LAS”) permit.65 This
type of permit prohibits discharge to surface water, and requires ground
water and soil monitoring, as well as quarterly reporting.66
Many states also require that all CAFOs, or at least a larger sub-
set of CAFOs than is required by federal law, obtain NPDES permits.67
For example, Arkansas requires that all animal feeding operations—of
which CAFOs are a subset—that use a liquid waste management system
obtain a permit.68 Some states have required that large farms that have
even the potential to discharge waste must obtain permits.69 Therefore,
this permitting requirement reaches further than the NPDES permitting
requirements under the CWA, which only address CAFOs that have
discharged or expect to discharge animal waste.70
Some states regulate certain chemical discharges more strictly than
under federal law. For example, Arizona requires that all CAFOs harvest
and dispose of manure in a way that minimizes the discharge of nitrogen
pollutants through runoff or leaching.71 Further, certain states, such as
59 Arkansas, for example, does not allow any effluent discharges. EPA, PROGRAMS AND
REGULATORY ACTIVITIES RELATED TO ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS—COMPENDIUM OF
STATE AFO PROGRAMS 13 (May 2002), https://www3.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/statecom.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZMP4-URMS].
60 See id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 See OFF. FOR STATE, TRIBAL, LOCAL & TERRITORIAL SUPPORT, CDC , supra note 51, at 3.
65 EPA, supra note 59, at 72.
66 Id. at 73.
67 See id. at 11.
68 Id.
69 Id.; see also Amanda Peterka, Agriculture: States Struggle to Regulate Factory Farms,
FRONTIERGROUP (Feb. 23, 2011), https://frontiergroup.org/media/fg/agriculture-states
-struggle-regulate-factory-farms [https://perma.cc/ZL73-K7LA].
70 EPA, supra note 19.
71 EPA, supra note 59, at 25.
2019] OUT OF SIGHT, BUT NOT OUT OF MIND 293
Arizona, Florida, Idaho, and Iowa, also have specific provisions that ex-
tend this care to groundwater, which is typically not regulated by the
federal CWA.72
Despite numerous state regulations that extend beyond the re-
quirements of the federal NPDES permitting system, enforcement of
state regulations is still lacking.73 Additionally, almost no state—except
Texas, which requires CAFOs to obtain AQPs—imposes air quality con-
trols on CAFOs.74 Therefore, air pollution caused by CAFOs is essentially
left unregulated.
II. SECONDARY LAWS AND CONCERNS THAT EXACERBATE THE LACK
OF REGULATION OF CAFOS
A. Right-to-Farm Laws
All fifty states have enacted right-to-farm laws that protect farm-
ers from nuisance lawsuits brought by community members who move
to areas near farming operations after these operations have com-
menced.75 While these laws were initially introduced in the 1970s and
’80s to protect farming operations from rapid urbanization, today these
laws vary in their scope.76 These laws often prohibit local governments
from enacting stricter agricultural regulations than state minimums.77
They also restrict the ability of residents who live near agricultural op-
erations to sue those operations even if there is a significant impact on
water or air quality, especially if those farm operations are conducting
“generally accepted agricultural management practices.”78 Some laws
72 ENVTL. LAW INST., STATE CONSTRAINTS: STATE-IMPOSED LIMITATIONS ON THE AUTHOR-
ITY OF AGENCIES TO REGULATE WATERS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THE FEDERAL CLEAN
WATER ACT 12 (May 2013).
73 See generally EPA, supra note 59, at 11–13.
74 UNITED SOYBEAN BOARD, ENVIRONMENTAL AUDIT OF ANIMAL AGRICULTURE 43 (2015).
75 Alexandra Limalo & Elizabeth Rumley, States’ Right-To-Farm Statutes, NAT’L AGRIC.
L. CTR., http://nationalaglawcenter.org/state-compilations/right-to-farm/ [https://perma.cc
/9TQP-NP9Q] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019).
76 See John Ikerd, CAFOs or Communities: A Time of Decision (July 26, 2014) (unpub-
lished conference paper), available at http://web.missouri.edu/ikerdj/papers/IndianaCAFO
Watch2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/KK5C-YLNS].
77 Oppose “Right to Farm” Legislation, AM. SOC’Y FOR PREVENTION CRUELTY TO ANIMALS,
https://www.aspca.org/animal-protection/public-policy/oppose-right-farm-legislation
[https://perma.cc/SU4F-KX4K] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019); see ALA. CODE § 6-5-127 (1975);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 413.072 (2010).
78 AM. SOC’Y FOR PREVENTION CRUELTY TO ANIMALS, supra note 77; see IOWA CODE § 657.11
(2014); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 286.473 (1995).
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even require that plaintiffs pay legal fees to the agricultural entity if the
suit is unsuccessful.79
Whether through express terms or through their deterrent effects,
these laws do a great deal to protect large animal agriculture operations
such as CAFOs from suits by residents of communities who surround these
operations.80 In recent years, several states have attempted to pass right-
to-farm amendments to their state constitutions.81 This not only grants
agricultural operations a constitutional right to farm, it also severely
reduces the protections available to potential plaintiffs in nuisance suits.82
B. Ag-Gag Laws
Ag-gag laws, as they are colloquially known, are essentially the
anti-whistle-blower laws of the industrial animal agriculture realm.83 As
concerns about the animal agriculture industry grew, especially among
animal protection and animal rights organizations, many of these organi-
zations began conducting undercover investigations.84 Although the moti-
vation of these investigations has typically been to expose the cruel and
illegal practices of many large scale industrial farms with an eye toward
animal welfare, these investigations often produce evidence that shows
illegal environmental activity as well.85 Although there has not been any
federal response to these undercover investigations, several states re-
sponded by introducing ag-gag laws.86 These laws sought to prohibit or
restrict the ability of undercover investigators to: (1) seek entry onto the
premises of factory farms and/or (2) record and distribute any audio or
video of the operations of these factory farms.87
Litigation and legislation across the country have yielded a variety
of results.88 Four states have declared ag-gag laws unconstitutional,
79 AM. SOC’Y FOR PREVENTION CRUELTY TO ANIMALS, supra note 77; see 740 ILL. COMP.
STAT 70/4.5 (1996); WIS. STAT. § 823.08 (2009).
80 Ikerd, supra note 76.
81 AM. SOC’Y FOR PREVENTION CRUELTY TO ANIMALS, supra note 77.
82 Id.
83 Alicia Prygoski, Brief Summary of Ag-gag Laws, MICH. STATE UNIV. C. LAW (2015), https://
www.animallaw.info/article/brief-summary-ag-gag-laws [https://perma.cc/FN49-NQEV].
84 Id.
85 See What is Ag-Gag?, LAST CHANCE FOR ANIMALS, https://www.lcanimal.org/index.php
/campaigns/ag-gag-laws-states-of-disgrace/what-is-ag-gag [https://perma.cc/7456-BT6Y]
(last visited Nov. 12, 2019).
86 Prygoski, supra note 83.
87 Id.
88 What Is Ag-Gag Legislation?, AM. SOC’Y FOR PREVENTION CRUELTY TO ANIMALS, https://
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seventeen state legislatures have failed to pass ag-gag laws, and six states
have criminalized whistle-blowing of farms.89 Ag-gag laws, in states where
they have been successfully introduced, can limit the public’s ability to
hold large scale animal agriculture farms accountable for the environ-
mental harms that stem from the operation of these facilities.
C. Lobbying Efforts by the Agriculture Industry
The animal agriculture industry has spent millions of dollars in
lobbying to persuade both the federal and state legislatures to pass money-
saving and/or disclosure-reducing legislation.90 In 2018 alone, Tyson Foods,
a big name in the meat processing industry, spent over $1.1 million on lob-
bying efforts.91 That same year, the dairy industry spent close to $7.5
million, the livestock industry close to $4 million, and the eggs and poultry
industry close to $2 million.92 These industries have lobbied heavily in
favor of ag-gag legislation and exemptions from Freedom of Information
Act (“FOIA”) requests.93
These lobbying efforts have enormous results, as is apparent from
the approval of an $867 billion farm bill in 2018.94 The 2018 Farm Bill,
which was signed into law by President Trump on December 20, 2018,
“widens loopholes” and allows the biggest and wealthiest companies—
many of which operate several large-scale animal agriculture farms such
as CAFOs—to obtain the largest subsidies.95 This is not a new develop-
ment. Rather, the top 10 percent of farms have accounted for 77 percent of
commodity subsidies over the last twenty-two years.96 This has amounted
www.aspca.org/animal-protection/public-policy/what-ag-gag-legislation [https://perma.cc
/R3W8-99LP] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019).
89 Id.
90 Agribusiness Sector Profile, 2018, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, https://www.open
secrets.org/lobby/indus.php?id=A [https://perma.cc/VUS9-DDDF].
91 Food Processing & Sales Industry Profile: Summary, 2018, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE
POLITICS, https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/indusclient.php?id=A09&year=2018 [https://
perma.cc/9TMM-3FSG].
92 CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, supra note 90.
93 Nancy Fink Huehnergarth, Big Agriculture Bullies and Lobbies To Keep Americans In
The Dark, FORBES (May 5, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/nancyhuehnergarth/2016
/05/05/big-ag-bullies-and-lobbies-to-keep-americans-in-the-dark/#161f97fa502c [https://
perma.cc/7TTH-QPGP].
94 What’s in the 2018 Farm Bill? The Good, The Bad and The Offal . . . , FARM AID (Dec. 20,
2018), https://www.farmaid.org/issues/farm-policy/whats-in-the-2018-farm-bill-the-good
-the-bad-and-the-offal/ [https://perma.cc/6MAC-FATE].
95 Id.
96 Karl Evers-Hillstrom, Farm Bill’s corporate farm subsidies remain intact after extensive
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to a total of $158 billion in taxpayer-funded subsidies.97 The massive tax
breaks that large farms enjoy operate as incentives to continue business
as usual, without taking into consideration the environmental impacts
of day-to-day operations.
D. Enforcement Failures
The EPA conducts inspections of CAFOs for any of the following
reasons:
[A] routine inspection, to follow up on a citizen tip or com-
plaint, for case development support after a violation has
been identified, for a follow-up inspection to ensure that
the permittee has implemented required controls or best
management practices[, or for a] compliance inspection to
ensure compliance with settlement requirements.98
In 2011, the EPA’s Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assur-
ance (“OECA”) first published a list of National Enforcement Initiatives,
“an inventory of the agency’s highest-priority pollution problems.”99 This
designates “enforcement and compliance resources” to some of the “most
serious environmental violations.”100 The EPA included preventing animal
waste from contaminating surface and ground water on this list in 2011
and 2014.101 When the inventory was renamed the National Compliance
Initiatives (“NCIs”), apparently to better convey the “overarching goal of
increased compliance and the use of not only enforcement actions, but
the full range of compliance assurance tools,” animal waste was one of the
eight NCIs listed for the 2017–2019 cycle.102
lobbying, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS (Dec. 14, 2018), https://www.opensecrets.org/news
/2018/12/farm-bill-corporate-farm-subsidies-intact-after-lobbying/ [https://perma.cc/7A86
-H8BS]; Commodity subsidies in the United States totaled $217.5 billion from 1995–2019,
EWG, https://farm.ewg.org/progdetail.php?fips=00000&progcode=totalfarm &page=conc
&regionname=theUnitedStates [https://perma.cc/445Z-BBAB] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019).
97 Evers-Hillstrom, supra note 96.
98 Inspections of Concentrated Animals Feeding Operations, EPA, https://www.epa.gov
/compliance/inspections-concentrated-animal-feeding-operations [https://perma.cc/M2MA
-JQQW] (last updated Oct. 19, 2016).
99 Brett Walton, Preventing CAFO Water Pollution Not An EPA Priority, CIRCLE BLUE
(Jan. 22, 2016), https://www.circleofblue.org/2016/world/67739/ [https://perma.cc/DE2F
-2QR7].
100 National Compliance Initiatives, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/national-com
pliance-initiatives [https://perma.cc/4BNY-D9VV] (last updated Sept. 10, 2018).
101 Walton, supra note 99.
102 EPA, supra note 100.
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However, EPA inspections of CAFOs are neither consistent from
year to year nor are they adequate. In recent years, EPA inspections of
CAFOs have dropped significantly.103 There were 291 inspections in 2012
but just 109 inspections in 2018.104 These numbers include both federal-
only inspections and federally led inspections with state participation.105
A mere eighteen of the 109 CAFOs inspected in 2018 were subject to any
type of enforcement action.106
Despite the fact that “nearly 60,000 miles of U.S. streams are
classified as impaired” due to animal feeding operations,107 only 6,591 of
the 19,961 CAFOs across the United States held NPDES permits in
2017.108 Since CAFOs that do not discharge into the navigable waters of
the United States are not subject to the NPDES permitting provisions of
the Clean Water Act, not all CAFOs must necessarily hold NPDES per-
mits.109 However, it is not unreasonable to believe that more than 33
percent of all CAFOs across the country are subject to NPDES permits.
Unfortunately, given the scarcity of inspections conducted by the EPA, it is
likely that many CAFOs that should obtain NPDES permits are simply
not doing so, and those CAFOs that have obtained the required permits
may not adhere to its requirements because of the lack of enforcement.
III. THE PROBLEM: THE ADVERSE EFFECTS OF CAFOS
Animal agriculture is one of the leading causes of a multitude of
the environmental issues that plague our planet, including climate change,
deforestation, water use, land use, and marine biodiversity loss.110 CAFOs
are especially lethal to our land and water resources.111 Given that CAFOs
have enormous potential to cause irreversible harm to our environment,
103 National Compliance Initiative: Preventing Animal Waste from Contaminating Surface
and Ground Water, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/national-compliance-initiative
-preventing-animal-waste-contaminating-surface-and-ground [https://perma.cc/P4ZJ
-PKSQ] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019).
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Walton, supra note 99.
108 NPDES CAFO Permitting Status Report—National Summary, Endyear 2017, EPA
(2017), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2018-05/documents/tracksum_endyear
_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/9NP9-6FET].
109 See 33 U.S.C. § 1362.
110 Haley Hansel, How Animal Agriculture Affects Our Planet, PACHAMAMA ALLIANCE
(Feb. 2, 2018), https://blog.pachamama.org/how-animal-agriculture-affects-our-planet
[https://perma.cc/D37M-6GDT].
111 Id.
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the sprinkling of laws currently on the books that regulate CAFOs are
wholly inadequate. Aside from environmental concerns, there are major
health, environmental justice, animal welfare, and economic market
failure concerns associated with CAFOs.112
Raising animals in such close quarters and subjecting them to
brutal living conditions and methods of slaughter not only pose a myriad
of animal welfare concerns,113 but this practice also endangers human
health.114 Studies have shown that a large percentage of factory farm
workers suffer from some type of respiratory illness, with a staggering 70
percent occurrence of such illness among swine operation workers.115 These
workers often also suffer from mental illness because of the emotionally
exhausting nature of the work.116 Further, the animal agriculture industry
seeks rural, often poor communities to build their CAFOs in because citi-
zens do not have the numbers or means to block these operations.117
Many towns allow these operations in the hopes that the operations’ reve-
nue earning potential will bring in money for the community and revital-
ize the town.118 While the town may reap some benefits, community
members suffer a diminished standard of living due to the water, air, noise,
and odor pollution that surrounds any large animal agriculture operation.119
Aside from the significant adverse health effects of CAFOs, lob-
bying efforts by the animal agriculture industry often lead to the types
of tax breaks and subsidies that were part of the 2018 Farm Bill.120 Due
to these extensive lobbying efforts, as well as tax breaks and subsidies,
the true costs of CAFOs are not accounted for in the price that consumers
of animal products pay. Instead, these externalized costs of CAFOs are
112 See generally Carrie Hribar, Understanding Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations
and Their Impact on Communities, NAT’L ASS’N LOCAL BOARDS HEALTH (Mark Schultz
ed., 2010), https://www.cdc.gov/nceh/ehs/docs/understanding_cafos_nalboh.pdf [https://
perma.cc/Z5V3-D77Z] (discussing the environmental, health, and economic effects of
CAFOs).
113 ANIMAL WELFARE INST., supra note 2.
114 See generally Hribar, supra note 112 (discussing several adverse health effects asso-
ciated with large scale animal feeding operations).
115 Livestock Confinement Dusts And Gases, IOWA ST. UNIV. (June 1992), http://nasdon
line.org/static_content/documents/1620/d001501.pdf [https://perma.cc/VVQ5-QNRU].
116 Id.
117 GURIAN-SHERMAN, supra note 6, at 5.
118 Wendee Nicole, CAFOs and Environmental Justice: The Case of North Carolina, 121
ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPECTIVES 182, 183 (2013).
119 See generally Hribar, supra note 112 (discussing several adverse health effects asso-
ciated with large scale animal feeding operations).
120 See supra Section II.C.
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shifted onto the public.121 In addition to these economic costs, certain
vulnerable members of the public will pay for CAFOs in something that
is arguably more valuable than money—their quality of life.122 Though
there is still debate about whether large animal feeding operations are
sited in poor and disadvantaged localities, or whether communities change
for the worse after these operations move to a given location, those with
the means to leave these areas tend to do so.123 Those that are left do not
have the means to uproot their lives,124 and are persistently affected by
the odors, sounds, and diminished water quality due to large animal
agriculture operations such as CAFOs.125 Successful lobbying by the in-
dustry makes it nearly impossible to prevent CAFOs from taking root in
such communities.
IV. REVAMPING THE ROLE OF FEDERALISM AS IT APPLIES TO THE
REGULATION OF CAFOS IN ORDER TO ADDRESS RISING
ENVIRONMENTAL, HEALTH, SOCIAL JUSTICE, AND ANIMAL
WELFARE CONCERNS
A. The Federal Government Should Prioritize the Enforcement of
Legislation and Regulations of CAFOs and Reexamine Its
Regional Enforcement Procedures
The EPA must be more diligent in enforcing the few existing fed-
eral laws concerning CAFOs. While states have the right to petition the
EPA to grant them the authority to administer their own NPDES permit-
ting programs, the EPA also has the right to rescind this authority.126
Regulations allow citizens to petition the EPA to rescind the authority of
states to administer NPDES permits.127 Between 1989 and 2017, twelve
121 GURIAN-SHERMAN, supra note 6, at 5–6.
122 See Julia Lenhardt & Yelena Ogneva-Himmelberger, Environmental Injustice in the
Spatial Distribution of Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations in Ohio, 6 ENVTL. JUSTICE
133, 134 (2013); Nicole, supra note 118, at 183, 187 (discussing the everyday environmental
injustices that residents of poor, rural communities in North Carolina and Ohio must
endure).
123 Nicole, supra note 118, at 183.
124 Id.
125 See generally Lenhardt & Ogneva-Himmelberger, supra note 122; Nicole, supra note
118 (discussing the adverse effects on air and water quality that residents of communities
close to large scale animal agriculture operations must live with).
126 See 33 U.S.C. § 1342.
127 40 C.F.R. § 123.64(b); see EPA, supra note 31.
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of the forty-nine citizen petitions submitted to the EPA were initiated,
fully or in part, because of certain states’ inability to regulate CAFOs as
required by the CWA.128 Yet, all of the petitions that have been resolved
as of February 2019 were denied or partially denied.129 Several of the peti-
tions were denied on the grounds that the states in question took correc-
tive action after the petition was filed with the EPA and thus there
remained no grounds to rescind the states’ permitting authority.130
While regulations that allow citizens to petition the EPA are pow-
erful in that they force the EPA to thoroughly investigate allegations that
states are not adhering to the CWA and provisions of their Memorandum
of Agreement, these investigations are few and far between.131 The EPA
also seems reluctant to rescind a state’s authority to administer NPDES
permits if the state takes corrective action.132 To avoid such fruitless
investigations following a petition, the EPA must proactively enforce the
provisions under which it granted states the authority to handle the
NPDES permitting program—preferably, before a petition is even filed.
There is some evidence of a relationship between the states in which
citizens have petitioned the EPA to rescind the states’ authority to grant
NPDES permits and the states in which citizen suits are filed in order to
enforce regulations dealing with CAFOs.133 This pattern suggests that citi-
zens, often environmental groups or coalitions, will exhaust all means
possible to force state or federal authorities to uphold the law.134 In-
depth, multi-year investigations and lawsuits can be more costly than
128 The EPA makes publically available all state program withdrawal petitions and other
documents involved in the proceedings. See EPA, supra note 31.
129 Id.
130 Id. (detailing causes of denial of state program withdrawal petitions under the “With-
drawal Petitions” tab).
131 See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., EPA, EPA MUST IMPROVE OVERSIGHT OF STATE EN-
FORCEMENT (Dec. 9, 2011), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-10/documents
/20111209-12-p-0113.pdf [https://perma.cc/F8NT-WFNK] (claiming that the “EPA does
not administer a consistent national enforcement program”).
132 See EPA, supra note 31.
133 Farming states such as Iowa, Illinois, and Wisconsin have each been subject to a state
NPDES program withdrawal petition submitted by citizens or citizen groups. See id.; see
also Steven M. Sellers, As Factory Farms Spread, So Do Toxic Tort Cases, BLOOMBERG
BUREAU NAT’L AFF. (May 5, 2017), https://news.bloombergenvironment.com/environment
-and-energy/as-factory-farms-spread-so-do-toxic-tort-cases?context=article-related
[https://perma.cc/SNK8-P5D6].
134 See generally James R. May, The Availability of State Environmental Citizen Suits,
18 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 53 (2004) (discussing the growth of the use of federal and
state environmental citizen suits).
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regular enforcement of environmental laws.135 As citizen suits become
more commonplace, it will be more cost effective for the EPA to conduct
regular inspections and enforcement checks on CAFOs. The regional EPA
offices, which are in charge of enforcing federal laws in states within the
region, may also be incentivized to conduct regular inspections through
favorable funding allocations.
Though the EPA’s OECA continues to designate water contamina-
tion from animal waste as a National Compliance Initiative (“NCI”),136
the annual number of EPA inspections of CAFOs and concluded enforce-
ment actions has decreased significantly in recent years.137 And, while
preventing animal waste from water contamination has historically been
a national priority of the NCI program, the OECA has announced that
it has removed this NCI from the priority list for the 2019 fiscal year.138
Given that enforcement efforts have decreased quite drastically over the
past several years—even though water contamination from animal waste
was listed as an NCI—it is likely that removing this NCI from the priority
list will deter the EPA even further, leading to even fewer inspections.
The majority of CAFO inspection and enforcement actions from
2008 to 2018 took place in Iowa, Texas, Pennsylvania, and New York.139
While these states do have a large number of CAFOs, and specifically
CAFOs with NPDES permits,140 many other states—Minnesota (which
has the highest number of CAFOs with NPDES permits in the country),
California, Maryland, and Nebraska, for example—which have just as
many, if not more, CAFOs within the state141 were subject to very few
inspections over ten years.142 This could be due to a range of factors: (1)
the EPA may have decided to concentrate its efforts on a few known
miscreant facilities, (2) there may have been specific complaints against
the facilities in the states that saw the most frequent inspection and
enforcement actions, or (3) there was disagreement with the states about
conducting inspections.
135 See generally id.; Jared Marx, Litigation and Settlement Basics: The Litigation Life
Cycle, CONSTRUCTION EXECUTIVE (Dec. 12, 2017), https://constructionexec.com/article
/litigation-and-settlement-basics-the-litigation-lifecycle [https://perma.cc/SUG5-N7TY].
136 EPA, supra note 100.
137 EPA, supra note 103.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 EPA, supra note 108.
141 Id.
142 EPA, supra note 103.
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Establishing a cross-regional accountability system may help en-
courage more uniform and frequent inspections of CAFOs at the federal
level. The different EPA regions143 may think about teaming up with all
or some of the other regions to create an “inter-region compact.” Interstate
compacts, which are agreements between two or more states in which they
adopt certain standards or agree to cooperate on a certain law or regula-
tion, have been used in the legislative realm for several decades.144 Drawing
inspiration from such compacts, the EPA may establish inter-region com-
pacts to hold each region accountable for conducting inspections of CAFOs.
Though these compacts need not be, and likely could not be, contracts in
the same way as interstate compacts usually are, the idea that one region
can hold another region accountable is powerful. Such compacts may allo-
cate funds based on what actions a region takes towards improving the
number of inspections they conduct. These actions might include reaching
out to the state authorities who are authorized to implement NPDES per-
mitting systems to schedule inspections, seriously considering any and all
reports against a facility from within the EPA or from the public, and
keeping accurate and up-to-date inspection and enforcement records. An
important feature of this compact would be the reporting requirements.
Each region would need to keep accurate records of all the actions they
have taken in order to demonstrate to other regions that they have been
taking the necessary actions.
Limited funds for such inspections and reporting are the biggest
hurdle to this inter-region compact. The EPA would not only have to
designate resources and personnel time to establish this compact in the
first place, which is likely to be a mammoth task on its own, but each
region would also be required to designate resources in order to uphold
the provisions of the compact. Bearing these prohibitions in mind, such
a compact is not meant to recreate the system. Rather, in the face of
limited resources and more lenient federal laws and regulations,145 it is
meant to establish a system of accountability within the EPA that will
hopefully yield improved inspection and enforcement numbers.
143 Visiting a Regional Office, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/visiting-regional-office
[https://perma.cc/2PBD-E8P9] (last updated June 14, 2018).
144 Understanding Interstate Compacts, COUNCIL ST. GOV’TS—NAT’L CTR. FOR INTERSTATE
COMPACTS, http://www.gsgp.org/media/1313/understanding_interstate_compacts-csgncic
.pdf [https://perma.cc/NAH7-MTTK] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019).
145 See supra Section II.A (discussing the lack of regulation of CAFOs under federal
legislation).
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B. States Should Administer Permitting Programs That Are
More Stringent than the Current NPDES Program and
Establish a Permit System That Addresses Air Pollution
Due to CAFO Emissions
Against a meager federal backdrop, states have to shoulder the
responsibility of picking up the environmental slack. Because limited funds
and resources may prohibit a significant increase in inspections and en-
forcement actions under a federal inter-region compact, state legislatures
and agencies must take advantage of their ability to impose additional
requirements on CAFOs. While it may be the case that a single state
agency controls the implementation and enforcement of regulations re-
garding CAFOs, sometimes this responsibility is delegated to more than
one state agency.146 In this case, a cross-agency accountability system,
similar to the inter-region compact at the federal level, may incentivize
these agencies to work together better. States are also more likely to be
motivated to enact stricter laws, given that they are more directly im-
pacted by the activities that occur at CAFOs within the state. It is often
easier for individuals to reach their state governments than to reach the
federal government, so state governments will most directly interact with
those adversely affected by CAFOs.
Since states are in the best position to understand the needs of their
communities, states are best able to decide what type of CAFO regulations,
in addition to federal regulations, these communities would most benefit
from. Each state should administer an NPDES permitting program that
requires CAFOs to satisfy all of the federal NPDES requirements, and each
state should also administer its own non-NPDES permitting program
that imposes additional restrictions on CAFOs. This program should re-
quire CAFOs to submit a waste management plan that limits land appli-
cation of waste and adheres to specific storage methods,147 submit an odor
management plan that identifies all of the potential sources of odors and
details a procedure to manage these odors,148 and obtain an air quality
permit that determines the acceptable quantities and types of air pollut-
ants.149 Additionally, state legislatures should revisit ambiguous terminol-
ogy in many state right-to-farm laws and codify definitions, so that large
146 See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., EPA, supra note 131, at 2.
147 See EPA, supra note 59, at 11.
148 See OFF. FOR STATE, TRIBAL, LOCAL & TERRITORIAL SUPPORT, CDC, supra note 51, at 1–2.
149 Id. at 2–3.
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agricultural farms such as CAFOs do not continue to use these laws to
conduct operations that adversely affect the community.150
Additionally, given that factory farms are no longer required to
report air emissions under CERCLA and this exemption for reporting air
emissions from animal waste at farms also applies to EPCRA,151 there
will be no federal emergency response to hazardous substance releases
on factory farms. States should introduce legislation that requires state
agencies to respond to such emergency releases on CAFOs within the state.
Many state environmental agencies already have emergency manage-
ment departments,152 so such legislation would not involve creating a
system from scratch.
CONCLUSION
Concentrated animal feeding operations are large scale animal
agriculture operations that produce more than 50 percent of the animals
that are slaughtered for food in the United States.153 CAFOs are not
adequately regulated under existing federal laws; in fact, they are some-
times expressly exempt from regulation. Yet, they produce devastating
effects on water and air quality, impose adverse health effects on work-
ers, and significantly reduce the quality of life of the residents of the
areas surrounding the facility. Many such residents have little recourse
against large scale animal facilities due to right-to-farm laws that often
prohibit residents from successfully bringing nuisance suits. Other mem-
bers of the public, specifically environmental advocacy groups, may also
be hindered in their efforts to fight against these facilities due to the
adoption of ag-gag laws by several states.
Thus, enforcement of existing laws and promulgation of more strin-
gent legislation is the most effective way to regulate CAFOs. The EPA
may try to incentivize more frequent inspection and enforcement actions
150 See supra Section II.A.
151 EPA, supra note 33.
152 See, e.g., Emergency Management Program, N.J. DEP’T ENVTL. PROT., https://www.nj.gov
/dep/emergency/ [https://perma.cc/3XNT-H8KT] (last updated Jan. 9, 2019); Emergency
Preparedness, IOWA DEP’T PUB. HEALTH, https://idph.iowa.gov/Environmental-Health
-Services/Emergency-Preparedness [https://perma.cc/56NA-NEM3] (last visited Nov. 12,
2019); VA Emergency Response & Planning Organizations, VA. DEP’T ENVTL. QUALITY,
https://www.deq.virginia.gov/Programs/Air/AirQualityPlanningEmissions/SARATitleIII
/VAEmergencyResponsePlanningOrganizations.aspx [https://perma.cc/NC2Y-34Z6] (last
visited Nov. 12, 2019).
153 GURIAN-SHERMAN, supra note 6, at 2.
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against CAFOs through an inter-region compact. Though the EPA may
be able to improve inspection and enforcement numbers, states will bear
the highest burden of regulating CAFOs where the federal government has
failed to do so. States should implement higher NPDES permit standards
than are required under the Clean Water Act, and they should addition-
ally provide emergency services in the case of hazardous emissions from
CAFOs within their state. These are not straightforward or quick solu-
tions by any means, and issues regarding costs and politics will create
hindrances to each of these proposed solutions. However, even an incre-
mental change in any one of these proposed areas could provide a gain
to an underprivileged group of people. This warrants consideration of
change in the way concentrated animal feeding operations are regulated
in the United States.
